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Thursday, May 21, 2020 | History

1 edition of A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change found in the catalog.

A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change

by Alexander Bochman

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  • 4 Currently reading

Published by Springer Berlin Heidelberg in Berlin, Heidelberg .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Computer science,
  • Artificial intelligence

  • About the Edition

    This monograph provides logical foundations and a uniform description for nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change. The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief change. Many results and constructions in the book are completely new and have not appeared earlier in the literature. The book is primarily intended for experts in Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Representation who are interested in tools for describing commonsense reasoning tasks as well as in representation capabilities of such tools. It is also of interest to general logicians.

    Edition Notes

    Statementby Alexander Bochman
    SeriesArtificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsQ334-342, TJ210.2-211.495
    The Physical Object
    Format[electronic resource] /
    Pagination1 online resource (xii, 435 p.)
    Number of Pages435
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL27071602M
    ISBN 103642075169, 3662045605
    ISBN 109783642075162, 9783662045602
    OCLC/WorldCa851372102

    This volume contains revised and extended versions of the papers presented at the Second International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, held in Grassau (FRG), June , The workshop brought together researchers with different backgrounds, including non-monotonic logic, logic programming, truth maintenance and philosophy. Their papers contain substantial advances to the logical. For in truth-estimation as in so much of life we have to rest content with doing the best one can actually manage to achieve in the circumstances. Default Reasoning BIBLIOGRAPHY [Bochman, ] A. Bochman. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. Berlin: Springer Verlag. [Harper, ] W. L. Harper.

    1 Introduction. A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non‐monotonic logics), probabilistic systems (most notably, but not exclusively, Bayesian probability theory), belief revision systems, neural networks. Belief revi-sion, abstract nonmonotonic inference relations, reasoning with conditionals, semantics of logic programs with negation, and applications of nonmonotonic formalisms as database query languages and specification languages for search prob lems all provided motivation and new directions for research in nonmonotonic reasoning.

    Abstract We consider the connections between belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning, using as a foundation the approach to the-ory change developed by Alchourron, G´ ardenfors and Makinson (the AGM ap-¨ proach). This is first generalized to allow the iteration of theory change . Inferences are steps in reasoning, moving from premises to logical consequences; etymologically, the word infer means to "carry forward". Inference is theoretically traditionally divided into deduction and induction, a distinction that in Europe dates at least to Aristotle (s BCE). Deduction is inference deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true, with the laws.


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A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change by Alexander Bochman Download PDF EPUB FB2

"This text provides a broad overview of topics related to non-classical consequence operators, nonmonotonic inference and belief change. The presentation is abstract and precise, and is grounded in a formal setting of logic." (Miroslav Truszezynski, Mathematical Reviews, Issue b)Cited by: This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view.

The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief cturer: Springer.

The main subject and objective of this book are logical foundations of non­ monotonic reasoning. This bears a presumption that there is such a thing as a general theory of non monotonic reasoning, as opposed to a bunch of systems for such a reasoning existing in the : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view. The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief : Alexander Bochman.

theory of belief change to understand some of traditional epistemology’s key notions, including justification and defeasibility. Rott’sprogram,then, is an attempt to unify traditional and formal epistemology by providing a fundamentally new, decision-theoretic foundation for belief change within which to study key epistemic notions and relations.

The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational : Hans Rott.

Makinson and P. Gärdenfors. Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. In Proceedings Workshop The Logic of Theory Change, Konstanz, Germany,pagesBerlin Heidelberg New York, Springer. Google Scholar Digital Library; R.

Moore. Autoepistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the close relations between the logic of theory change (alias belief revision) on the one hand, and nonmonotonic logic on the other. Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change Daniel Hunter E.

Highway Santa Ynez, CA 2 BELIEF CHANGE AND INFERENCE A monotonic inference relation is one for which the criticized the theory of belief change just presented on the grounds that it cannot account for iterated belief change. To handle iterated. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such inferences.

Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed.

A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. Alexander Bochman - - Springer. Hannes Leitgeb, Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation Into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition. Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems.

The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of. This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view.

The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief change. As has been said, in the general correspondence between nonmonotonic inference and belief change, contraction inference corresponds to the basic operation of belief contraction.

This augments the idea that belief change and nonmonotonic inference are “two sides of the same coin” and extends it to belief contractions. Get this from a library. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. [Alexander Bochman] -- This monograph provides logical foundations and a uniform description for nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change.

The approach to both these subjects is. knygynai Vilniuje ir Kaune jau veikia. Išsirinkite vietoje arba nemokamai atsiimkite užsakymą. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change between nonmonotonic inference and belief change, contraction inference corresponds to the basic operation of belief.

We provide a conceptual description of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning as comprising two essentially different theories, preferential and explanatory nonmonotonic reasoning.

The relationship between the two constitutes the main theoretical problem of nonmonotonic reasoning, and its solution should hopefully provide an impetus for the future development of the field.

The way of thinking in partially known circumstances suggested by nonmonotonic reasoning consists in using justified beliefs and reasonable assumptions that can guide us in our decisions. Accordingly, nonmonotonic reasoning can be described as a theory of making and revising assumptions in a reasoned or principled way [Doyle, ].

Of course. Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundations of Commonsense Gerhard Brewka GMD, Sankt Augustin, Germany The right of the University 0/ Cambridge to print and self. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice.

The book unifies lively and significant strands of.A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change - numerical methods. SpringerISBNpp. I-XII, A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change. Artif. Intell. (): () [j10] view. Alexander Bochman: Belief Contraction as Nonmonotonic Inference.

J. Symb. Log. 65 (2.— 5 — Such assistance from the logic of belief change is itself only to be expected, especially in view of the close connections, noted in Makinson and Gärdenfors (), between properties that may hold of belief revision operators, and those that may hold of nonmonotonic inference relations.